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Figure 2: The largest container ports worldwide in 2013  
Source: Statista (2014) 
 
In dealing with this rising competition, the two ports must come up with strategic actions in 
both short-term and long-term plans. This research digs into the long-term competing strategy of 
capacity expansion investment. The nature of this strategy can be clearly seen from the following 
point of views. Firstly, capacity of HKP and SZP are, in fact, smaller than the actual throughputs 
that the two ports are supposed to deal with, which are about 22 million TEUs in 2013. When 
ports are dealing with excessive throughput over its real capacity, congestion cost incurs. This 
immediately reduces the attractiveness of the port itself comparing with other rivals. Hence, in the 
rising transport market, capacity expansion not only helps to create a larger playground for 
shippers but also solve the issues of market demand, prospectively reduce vessel’s turnaround 
time and increase port attractiveness. Secondly, the expansion allows ports to enjoy a cost 
advantage from economies of scales, especially HKP with its considerably high cost structure. 
Thirdly, when ports compete in quantity, an increase in capacity will increase own port’s output 
and reduce the competing port’s output. Owing to capacity expansion, the market can be fully 
served without the need of other entrants.  Therefore, in the context of recent port development in 
the PRD region, port expansion dissuades new entrants from the port market. It was pointed out 
by Zhang (2008) that calls for more capacity in the port or its hinterland to reduce congestions are 
stronger in a competitive setting than in the absence of rivalry, such as a single port case. All 
things considered, capacity expansion is indeed a long-term strategy worthy of consideration.  
Following this approach, the paper aims to investigate the two selected ports’ decision making 
process regarding the mentioned long-term plan by applying game theory and uncertainty theory. 
In particular, a two-person game is built, in which the study of how one port decides to invest 
given the result from the other port’s choice is presented. In considering the real-world factors in 
this game, it is recognized that uncertain demand which constitutes ports’ payoff should be 










(millions of TEUs) 
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included. Demand factor is indeed a fluctuating variable in the future. Different values of demand 
can be acquired with a certain percent of chance under different circumstances. Because the future 
is unidentified, circumstances are also not surely known. This fact was also admitted by Wang, 
that the characteristics of a regional port system made it truly difficult to forecast future port 
throughput accurately (2006, p.437). In addition, previous future port forecasts did not really 
show its perfection; for example, it was predicted that the future port traffic scenarios for HKP in 
2010 increased to at least 26.14 million TEU while the real throughput in 2013 was actually only 
about 22 million TEU (GHP Hong Kong Ltd, 2004). Furthermore, experiences in port expansion 
seems not to be sufficient and sufficiently reliable since there existed ideas about the appearance 
of Container Terminal 9 of Hong Kong which was “too much, too late” (Bloomberg, 2004). All 




II. Literature Review 
 
Several research literatures have also studied capacity expansion as well as have used game 
theory to investigate general competition and port competition issues in both short-term and long-
term plans.  
As to the general competition, Tabuchi (1994) constructed a two-stage game in which firms 
first select the location and then observe the chosen locations and compete in price. The result 
suggested that two firms maximized their distance in one dimension, but minimized their distance 
in the other dimension; the firms were better off if they are located sequentially rather than 
simultaneously; and the welfare loss in equilibrium was 1.6 to 4 times as large as that in optimum. 
Besides, Gilbert (1984) developed a theory of competition in markets with indivisible and 
irreversible investments. The research showed that if firms acted as Nash competitors with 
binding contracts, revenues would exceed costs for any number of firms and otherwise identical 
firms would earn different profits.  
In considering short-term port competition strategy or price competition, Park (2012) used the 
Hotelling’s game to solve the problem of equilibrium price which concluded that a port with 
better service, lower port charge and shipping cost could monopolize all transhipment containers 
in a specific route while the other one must increase service level or give up the market.  
With respect to capacity expansion using game theory, Park (2006) developed a game 
theoretic model for an oligopoly trans-shipment container market. This analysis proved that it 
would be costly and unprofitable to pursue defence of all trans-shipment cargoes that was lost to 
the low-cost terminal. Development efforts should focus on those markets that yielded greater 
differences in value between the two hub ports and less vulnerable to capture by a lower cost port 
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operation. Luo (2009) also investigated the long-term strategy of two ports that proved both ports 
could expand only when the market demand was sufficiently high. 
This study does add to the body of literature which considers port competitiveness, but with a 
more practical approach. In details, it concerns uncertainty in the investment decision that 
distinguishes this research from the previous ones. As a matter of fact, any long-term decision 
involves investment risks due to future unknown factors. Since future variables are mysterious to 
players and each player’s payoff is also unidentified to the other, a proper method to evaluate 
them should be reached. Liu (2013) stated that real decisions are usually made in the state of 
indeterminacy. In order to model indeterminacy, there exist two mathematical systems, namely 
probability and uncertainty theory. However, as mentioned above, experiences from port 
expansion are not sufficient and reliable to construct a large-enough sample size so uncertainty 
theory is the only solution to the problem.  
 
 
III. Theoretical basis 
 
3.1. Game model 
It is assumed that the capacity expansion project is managed by a separate operator so profit 
from the project is evaluated as that of an independent property, rather than one accumulated from 
ports' profit in its existing capacity. Another assumption is that the decision of investment is only 
based on the forecasted financial performance or profit brought back from the project, excluding 
consideration of other factors.  
The game is designed for two players, namely HKP and SZP in which the pure strategy set of 
each player includes two strategies of Not Invest and Invest. Besides, the payoff of one player 
depends on that player's own decision given the other's action. Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the 
optimal choice of both players. The payoff profiles of two ports are presented below: 
 
Table 1: Payoff profiles of Hong Kong Port and Shenzhen Port 
HKP/SZP Not Invest Invest 
Not Invest 0 ; 0 0 ; Ɏௌሺܥு଴ǡ ܥௌூሻ െܫௌ 
Invest Ɏு൫ܥுூ ǡ ܥௌ଴൯ െ ܫு; 0 Ɏுሺܥுூ ǡ ܥௌூሻ െ ܫு; Ɏௌሺܥுூ ǡ ܥௌூሻ െܫௌ 
(Note: ʌ is profit, ܥூis capacity after expansion; ܥ଴ is capacity without expansion; I is investment cost) 
 
Given the payoffs above, two ports come up with the following strategic decisions:  
x ሺߨ െ ܫሻுǡௌ ൐ Ͳ: Both choose to Invest. NE is (Invest, Invest) 
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x ሺߨ െ ܫሻுǡௌ ൑ Ͳ: Both choose Not Invest. NE is (Not invest, Not invest) 
x ሺߨ െ ܫሻு ൑ Ͳ and ሺߨ െ ܫሻௌ ൐ Ͳ: HKP chooses Not Invest and SZP chooses Invest. NE is 
(Not invest, Invest) 
x ሺߨ െ ܫሻௌ ൑ Ͳ and ሺߨ െ ܫሻு ൐ Ͳ: SZP chooses Not Invest and HKP chooses Invest. NE is 
(Invest, Not invest) 
3.2. Payoff determination 
3.2.1. Function 
Payoff function of the two ports is determined as the difference between port revenue and 
operating expenses and investment cost, which is presented as below: 
 
Revenue function:  ൌ  ൈ  
Operational Cost function: ܧ ൌ ݔ ൈ ܦ ൈ  
Cost factor =஽
஼
  (This factor denotes the property of port’s operating cost which is proportional 
with demand and decreases owing to capacity)  
Payoff function:  
ߨ ൌ  ൈ  െ ݔ ൈ  ൈ ஽
஼
െ ܫ (1) 
(Note: R is revenue, P is price, D is demand, x is unit cost) 
 
3.2.2. Uncertain Payoff 
3.2.2.1. Preliminary of Uncertainty Theory 
At first, some following basic concepts and properties of uncertainty theory will be used 
throughout this paper. 
Definition 1 (Liu, 2013) An uncertain variable is a measurable function ߦ from an uncertainty 
space ሺȞǡ ࣦǡࣧሻ to the set of real numbers, such that ሼߦ א ȝሽ is an event for any Borel set B. 
Definition 2 (Liu, 2013) The uncertainty distribution of an uncertain variable ߦ is defined by 
Ȱሺݔሻ ൌ ࣧሼߦ ൑ ݔሽ  for any real number x. For example, the linear uncertain variable has an 
uncertainty distribution 
ߔሺݔሻ ൌ ቐ
Ͳǡ ݂݅ݔ ൏ ܽ
ሺݔ െ ܽሻ ሺܾ െ ܽሻΤ ǡ݂݅ܽ ൑ ݔ ൏ ܾ
ͳǡ ݂݅ݔ ൒ ܾ
 (2) 
denoted by ࣦሺܽǡ ܾሻwhere a and b are real numbers with ሺܽ ൏ ܾሻ. 
Definition 3 (Liu, 2013) Let ߦ be an uncertain variable. Then the expected value of ߦ is 
defined by  
ሾɌሿ ൌ ׬ ሼɌ ൒ ሽ
ାஶ
଴ ݀ݎ െ׬ ሼɌ ൑ ሽ
଴
ିஶ ݀ݎ (3) 
provided that at least one of the two integrals is finite. 
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3.2.2.2. Methods to decide payoff value 
There are two methods in deciding the payoff value. Firstly, if Demand is considered as an 
uncertain variable (ߦ), it can be estimated using Uncertain Statistics. After that, the payoff of each 
player in each situation is calculated using expected value of Demand - ሺߦሻ. Given the expert’s 
experimental data, Liu (2013, p.127) suggested a type of linear interpolation method to obtain its 
empirical uncertainty distribution of ߦ, that is: 
 
Ȱሺݔሻ ൌ ൞




ǡ ݂݅୧ ൑ ݔ ൑ ݔ୧ାଵǡ ͳ ൑  ൏ ݊
ͳǡ ݂݅ݔ ൐ ݔ୬
 (4) 
 














Secondly, if Payoff is considered as an uncertain variable (ߦ), the game can be solved by 
using the Expected NE strategy for uncertain variables as below. 
Any two-person game can be presented as Ȟ ൌ ۃሼǡ ሽǡ ǡ ǡ ۄ where  ൌ ሼͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡሽbe 
the pure strategy set of player I, and  ൌ ሼͳǡʹǡ ǥ ǡ ሽ be the pure strategy set of player J; A and B 
comprise ൈ matrices with Ɍ௜௝and Ʉ௜௝symbolizing the payoffs of the player I and J associated 
with the strategy profile ሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻǡrespectively. Accordingly, the mixed strategy game is illustrated as 
Ȟǯ ൌ ۃሼǡ ሽǡ ୍୎ǡ ǡ ۄ  where the sets of all mixed strategies available for two players are 
ܵூ ൌ ሼሺݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݔ௠ሻ் א ࣬ା௠ȁσ ݔ௜௠௜ୀଵ ൌ ͳሽand ௃ܵ ൌ ൛ሺݕଵǡ ݕଶǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݕ௡ሻ் א ࣬ା
௡ȁσ ݕ௝௡௝ୀଵ ൌ ͳൟ. 
When the strategies are randomized, a mixed strategy profileሺݔǡ ݕሻfrom each player’s own set 
is chosen which generates the outcome of the game to be ሺݔ்ܣݕǡ ݔ்ܤݕሻ, where ݔ்ܣݕ and ݔ்ܤݕ 
are the expected payoffs of player I and J respectively. Since the players’ goals are to maximize 
the expected value of their uncertain payoffs, the best responses of player I to a strategy ݕכ א ௃ܵ 
are the optimal solutions of the uncertain expected value model is ௫אୗ౅ ሾݔ
୻෩ݕכሿand the best 
responses of player J to a strategy ݔכ א ܵூ  are the optimal solutions of the uncertain expected 
value model is ௬אୗె ሾݔ
כ୻෩ݕሿ. 
Then based on the rational reactions of the player, Gao (2011) presented a new NE strategy as 
follows: 
 
כ ൌ ൣݔכ୻෩ݕכ൧ ൒ ൣݔ୻෩ݕכ൧׊ݔ א ܵூ (6) 
 
כ ൌ ൣݔכ୻෩ݕכ൧ ൒ ൣݔכ୻෩ݕ൧׊ݕ א ௃ (7) 
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The pair ሺݑכǡ ݒכሻ is called the expected value of the game. Let ሺݔכǡ ݕכሻ א ூܵ ൈ ௃ܵ  be an 
















Let all entries Ɍ௜௝ and Ʉ௜௝ be independent uncertain variables, then a strategy ሺݔכǡ ݕכሻ א ܵூ ൈ
௃ܵis an ENES in ī if and only if the point ൫ݔכǡ ݕכǡ ݔכ୻οݕכǡ ݔכ୻׏ݕכ൯ is an optimal solution to the 






ۓ ݉ܽݔሺݔǡ ݕǡ ݑǡ ݒሻݔ
்ሺοு ൅ ߘௌሻݕ െ ݑ െ ݒ
ݏݑܾ݆݁ܿݐݐ݋ǣοݕ ൑ ሺݑǡ ݑǡ ǥ ǡ ݑሻ்
׏்ݔ ൑ ሺݒǡ ݒǡ ǥ ǡ ݒሻ்
׊ݔ א ܵூǢ ݕ א ௃ܵǢ ݑǡ ݒ א ࣬
 (10) 
 
IV. Case study 
 
4.1.  Scenario 
HKP is supposed to consider the expansion of Container Terminal 10 (CT10) with  a capacity 
of 2.6 mil TEUs (Legislative Council of Hong Kong, 2001) and an investment cost of $HK 10 
billion (San, 1998) (equivalent to $1.3 billion).  While SZP is assumed to plan the Yantian 
terminal expansion project with a capacity of 3.7 million TEUs and an investment cost of RMB 
11 billion (Zi, 2005) (equivalent to $1.8 billion).  The plan for CT10 and Yantian terminal were 
floated years ago; however, were postponed due to weak shipping demand.  Thus, figures of CT9 
and previous Yantian terminal expansion related numbers are used in our study. If the Yantian 
project is normalized as the same size with CT10 of 2.6 million TEUs, the corresponding 
investment cost will be driven down to $1.2 billion. If the cost is amortized over 20 years, the 
yearly allocated cost will be $65 million and $60 million for HKP and SZP respectively. 
According to the Study on HKP Cargo Forecasts (GHP Hong Kong Ltd, 2008), future port 
traffic scenarios are divided into five cases in which the total future volumes of HKP are projected 
to be 24.9, 25.4, 26.3, 27.2 and 33.8 million TEUs. However, the fifth case is very hard to 
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implement since there is yet no solution to the cost disadvantage of HKP. Therefore, we omitted 
the fifth scenario in our study. With projected TEUs profile, the growth in volume of TEUs can be 
calculated relatively as 2.9, 3.4, 4.3 and 5.2 million TEUs. 
Since exact port charges are difficult to determine due to the different pricing structure of port 
operation and confidentiality, port prices are assumed to be terminal handling charges (THC) 
which are in turn approximately $250 and $150 for HKP and SZP (Legislative Council of Hong 
Kong, 2013). Besides, based on the analysis of Wang, HKP implements especially high land 
transportation costs and port operation costs which are about two to three times more than that of 
SZP (2000, p.10), the operating cost of HKP and SZP are assumed to be $200 and $80 
respectively. Furthermore, the market share of the two ports in the container port market is 50% - 
50%, which is based on the most recent statistics of port throughputs in 2012 and 2013 (See 
Figure 1, 2). 
 
4.2.  Case 1 – Consider Demand as an uncertain variable 
Let us assume an expert in port management is employed to give out an evaluation of future 
cargo demand, the following data is then collected from the questionnaire. The content of it is 
about “How likely is demand less than or equal to each forecasted demand level?” 
 
Following pairs of estimation data are supposed to be given: 
 
ሺݔଵǡ ߙଵሻ= (2.9, 0) 
ሺݔଶǡ ߙଶሻ= (3.4, 0.5) 
ሺݔଷǡ ߙଷሻ= (4.3, 0.8) 
ሺݔସǡ ߙସሻ= (5.2, 1) 
 








ͶǤ͵ ൅ ቀͳ െ ଴Ǥ଼ାଵ
ଶ
ቁ ͷǤʹ ൌ ͵Ǥ͸ͺ (million TEUs) 
 
Applying this expected value of demand to equation (1), we come up with the following 
results: 
 
x If HKP invests, SZP does not invest: ʌH = $-186.72 million 
x If HKP invests, SZP does not invest: ʌS = $75.31 million 
x If 2 ports invest: ʌH = $134.57 million, ʌS = $111.83 million 
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Therefore, regardless of whether HKP invests or not, SZP has a dominant strategy of Invest 
with positive gain in all cases and HKP should follow the same strategy. NE is (Invest, Invest, 
134.57, 111.83) 
 
4.3.  Case 2 – Consider Payoff as an uncertain variable 
Following the future port traffic forecast mentioned above, all calculated values of the two 
ports’ payoffs in all cases are considered as independent uncertain variables. The uncertain 
payoffs Ɍୌ and Ʉୗ of two ports can be computed as below: 
 
ɌୌଵଵሺͲǡ Ͳǡ Ͳǡ Ͳሻ; ɌୌଵଶሺͲǡ Ͳǡ Ͳǡ Ͳሻ;  
Ɍୌଶଵሺͳ͵ǤͲͺǡ ሺͳͲͶǤʹ͵ሻǡ ሺͶͳʹǤ͵ͳሻǡ ሺͺͶͷሻሻ; Ɍୌଶଶሺͳ͵ͷǤ͹͹ǡ ͳ͵͹Ǥ͸ͻǡ ͳͳ͸Ǥͻʹǡ ͸ͷሻ 
ɄୗଵଵሺͲǡ Ͳǡ Ͳǡ Ͳሻ; Ʉୗଵଶሺͳͳ͸Ǥʹ͵ǡ ͻͶǤ͵ͳǡ ͳ͸ǤͲͺǡ ሺͳͳʹሻሻ; 
ɄୗଶଵሺͲǡ Ͳǡ Ͳǡ Ͳሻ; ɄୗଶଶሺͻʹǤͺͳǡ ͳͲ͸ǤͲͺǡ ͳʹͲǤʹ͹ǡ ͳʹʹሻ 
 









To simplify the problem, only pure strategies are assumed to be adopted, so it is easy to see 
that the following optimal solution satisfies the relative quadratic program: (Invest, Invest, 113.85, 
110.29). The result confirms its consistency with the first method which gives SZP a better 





The result yielded from the two methods come to the same conclusion that SZP is dominant in 
capacity investment while HKP can only gain profit from investing when SZP also does. This 
conclusion reflects the fact that SZP, with strong growth rate in containerized cargo throughput 
for a number of years despite some general declines across Asia during the global financial crisis, 
can continue to develop and prospectively surpass HKP in the near future. HKP with high cost 
structure and without solutions to the problem finds no other way to deal with increasing market 
demand but to wait for the expansion of the other port. Besides, both ports incur losses when 
demand far exceeds available capacity, especially HKP. It experiences a loss in profit when 
demand is just 0.8 million TEUs more than its capacity, because of the extra cost to deal with 
excess demand. This study; thus, raises up an issue of congestion costs when ports have to deal 
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with extra throughput due to demand growth. However, it opens up opportunities for a bright 
future when ports can both gain profit as they commit to the investment strategy to adapt to 
market demand; but again, HKP is the one that needs more consideration as well as a better future 
forecast in order not to incur losses in operation. 
In general, it can be said that a port with a more competitive service price, lower operating 
costs and investment costs are more likely to expand capacity to adapt to the increase in market 
demand, while a more expensive port with its high costs profile may be more reluctant to engage 
in long-term investment. This paper demonstrates with thorough investigation of the latest 
situation between two selected ports and is unique in taking account of a real-world factor of 
uncertain demand to its analysis. However, as the uncertainty theory relies entirely on experts’ 
knowledge to determine its set of data, this study can only be applied practically when sufficient 
professional and qualified experts are there to provide reliable ideas on the issue of interest. 
 






Bloomberg (2004), Hong Kong’s Container Terminal 9 Opens Too Much Too Late, 
Available from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=areZrvoIsvZw& 
refer=asia, last accessed in October 2014. 
Gao, J. (2011), Uncertain-Payoff Two-Player Nonzero-Sum Game, Available from 
http://orsc.edu.cn/online/111009.pdf, last accessed in September 2014. 
GHP Hong Kong Ltd (2004), Study on Hong Kong Port – Master Plan 2020, Available from 
http://www.pdc.gov.hk/eng/plan2020/pdf/annex.pdf , last accessed in October 2014. 
GHP Hong Kong Ltd (2008), Study on Hong Kong Port Cargo Forecasts 2005/2006, 
Available from http://www.pdc.gov.hk/docs/PCF05-06ES.pdf, last accessed in October 2014.  
Gilbert, R. J. and Harris R. G. (1984), Competition with Lumpy Investment, The RAND 
Journal of Economics, Volume 15, No. 2, pp.197-212. 
Legislative Council of Hong Kong (2001), Container Terminals and Port Facilities in Hong 
Kong,  Available from http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-01/english/panels/es/papers/a646e05.pdf, 
last accessed in September 2014. 
Legislative Council of Hong Kong (2013), Competitiveness of the Port of Hong Kong, 
Available from http://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/english/1314rb01-competitivene 
ss-of-the-port-of-hong-kong-20131121-e.pdf, last accessed in September 2014. 
Liu, B. (2013), Uncertainty Theory, 4th edition, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 
DO, PARK,CHOI KANG, BAIK / Application of Game Theory and Uncertainty Theory in Port Competition between 
Hong Kong Port and Shenzhen Port 
 
 23
Luo, M., Liu, L. and Gao, F. (2012), Port Competition Using Capacity Expansion and Pricing, 
International Forum on Shipping, Ports and Airports (IFSPA) 2009-Post-Financial Tsunami: The 
Way Forward for Shipping, Transport and International Trade. 
Park, G. K., Han, X. and Ahn T. Y. (2012), On the Application of Game Theory to the 
Competition among Major Ports in NE Asia for T/S Cargoes, Journal of Korean Institute of 
Intelligent Systems, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 2012, pp. 261-266. 
Park, Y. A, Christopher, M. A. and Choi Y. S. (2006), A Strategic Model of Competition 
among Container Ports in Northeast Asia, Available from http://www.kmi.re.kr/data/linksoft/ 
bibdata/bib_101071.pdf , last accessed in October 2014.  
San, W. J. (1998), CT9 Disputes End In “Bargain” Deal, Available from http:// 
www.scmp.com/article/264097/ct9-disputes-end-bargain-deal, last accessed in October 2014.  
Statista (2014), Turnover Volume Of The Largest Container Ports World Wide, Available 
from http://www.statista.com/statistics/264171/turnover-volume-of-the-largest-container-ports-
worldwide/, last accessed in October 2014. 
Tabuchi, T. (1994), Two-stage two-dimensional spatial competition between two firms, 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp.207-227. 
Wang, J. J., (2000) The Revolution of a Regional Container Port System: the Pearl River 
Delta, Available from http://202.114.89.60/resource/pdf/2031.pdf , last accessed in October 2014 
Wang, J. J., (2006) Port Choice and Port Competition in the Pearl River Delta: A Logistics 
Approach, Hong Kong University Press 2006, Hong Kong. 
Wei, S. (2013), Prospect on the Collaborative Development of the Port and Logistics of 
Shenzhen, Available from http://globeinst.info/files/wpsf_global_2013/pres/shenzhen/1_shenzhen 
_en.pdf, last accessed in October 2014.  
Zhang, A. (2008), The Impact of Hinterland Access Conditions on Rivalry between Ports, 
Discussion Paper No. 2008-8, International Transport Forum http://www.international 
transportforum.org/jtrc/discussionpapers/DP200808.pdf.  
Zi, M. (2005), 11 billion RMB for Yantian port expansion, Available from http:// 
www.newsgd.com/citiesandtowns/shenzhen/news/200511100075.htm, last accessed in October 
2014.  
 
